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"Strike Three, Yer Out!?": Examining
the Constitutional Limits on the Use of
Prior Uncounseled DWI Convictions to
Impose Mandatory Prison Sentences on
Repeat DWI Offenders*
INTRODUCTION
In response to public outcry over accidents involving drunk driv-
ers, most states have strengthened their drunk driving laws.1 In-
creased penalties for driving while intoxicated (DWI)2 include im-
prisonment, fines, loss of driving privileges and community service.
3
As the penalties have become more severe, questions have arisen
concerning the application of the Bill of Rights in DWI cases. Con-
* The author wishes to thank those who have provided guidance and helpful
recommendations in the production of this Comment, including Harry Zimmerman, Lisa
Werries, Dennis Fisher, and Herb Pounder. This Comment is dedicated to my loving
wife, Kellie, and to babina, Nicole Elysse.
1. In 1983, 40 states increased penalties for drunk driving. In 1982, California
replaced Vehicle Code § 23102 with the more stringent Vehicle Code § 23152.
2. Some states refer to the offense as driving while under the influence of an intoxi-
cating liquor (DUII), operating while under the influence (OUI) or driving while under
the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI). See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 291-4(a)(2)
(1985). For the sake of consistency, DWI will be used throughout this Comment. See,
e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152 (West 1985 & Supp. 1990).
3. In California, penalties for a first time offense include a maximum of six months
imprisonment and a fine up to $1,000, license suspension up to six months with commu-
nity service and alcohol education programs in lieu of imprisonment. CAL. VEH. CODE §§
13352, 23152, 23160, 23161, 23206 (West 1985 & Supp. 1990).
stitutional guarantees including the right to trial by jury,4 protection
against self-incrimination, 5 and an indigent's right to court-ap-
pointed counsel6 have been held inapplicable in many DWI cases.
To further deter drunk driving, most states have enacted
mandatory incarceration sentences for repeat offenders. An indi-
gent's right to court-appointed counsel at repeat offender trials has
been recognized because of the possibility of incarceration.7 How-
ever, repeat DWI offenders often receive' actual incarceration
sentences based solely upon prior convictions. Because there has
been an increase in guilty pleas by first time offenders,8 the constitu-
tionality of using uncounseled convictions to impose mandatory mini-
mum prison sentences has been questioned. Courts differ in permit-
ting the use of these convictions.
This Comment examines the constitutional implications of using
prior uncounseled DWI convictions to incarcerate repeat DWI of-
fenders. Part I reviews the Supreme Court decisions which estab-
lished the right to court-appointed counsel for the indigent accused.
Part II examines the federal constitutional limitations on the collat-
eral use of prior uncounseled convictions. Part III analyzes state
court decisions involving the collateral use of prior uncounseled DWI
convictions. Part IV critically evaluates these decisions. This Com-
ment concludes that, because an uncounseled conviction is inherently
unreliable, it should not be used to mandatorily incarcerate a DWI
4. See Comment, The Federal Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury for the Of-
fense of Driving While Intocicated, 73 MINN. L. REv. 122 (1988) (concluding that in
most cases DWI is a serious offense requiring a jury trial). But see, Blanton v. City of 14.
Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989). The Court presumed that, for purposes of the sixth
amendment, any offense carrying a maximum prison sentence of six months or less was
viewed by society to be "petty." Id. at 543. Because the maximum authorized prison
sentence for first-time DWI offenders in Nevada did not exceed six months, the Court
held that the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial. Id. at 545.
5. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990). In Muniz, decided on
June 18, 1990, the Court considered the scope of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination when Muniz was questioned after an arrest for DWI. Muniz had not
been given Miranda warnings. Id. at 2641-42.
The Court held that slurred speech exhibited by Muniz and videotaped at the police
booking facility was not testimonial information, and thus was not protected by the fifth
amendment's privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Id. at 2645. However,
Muniz' answer to a question that required him to calculate the date of his sixth birthday
was considered compelled testimony and thus violated his fifth amendment right. Id. at
2646-47.
6. The Supreme Court has developed a "bright-line" approach (actual incarcera-
tion) that establishes when an indigent's right to court-appointed counsel attaches. See
infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. Because states often do not appoint counsel for
minor offenses, including first DWI offenses, convictions are often obtained without
counsel.
7. See supra note 6.
S. See, e.g., Bellamy, Study Says Safe Roads Act Effective, United Press Interna-
tional, May 24, 1984 (about 80% of those charged with DWI pled guilty in 1984 versus
60% in past years).
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repeat offender.
I. INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
.. . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."9 The rule
that in some circumstances indigent criminal defendants require the
assistance of court-appointed counsel dates back to the famous
"Scottsboro Boys" case of Powell v. Alabama.10 In Powell, seven
uneducated, illiterate, and apparently indigent black defendants,
convicted of raping two white women, were sentenced to death.1" Be-
cause of the hostile atmosphere surrounding the trial and the indi-
gent defendants' inability to adequately defend themselves, the, Su-
preme Court reversed."2 The Court held that the defendants had
been denied due process of law by the trial court's failure to appoint
effective counsel to assist them at their trials.' 3
Although the indigent defendants' due process rights were held to
have been violated in Powell, the Court did not require court-ap-
pointed counsel in all state prosecutions.' 4 Ten years later, the Court
reaffirmed its position in Betts v. Brady."5 The Court expressly held
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not
demand "that in every criminal case, whatever the circumstances, a
State must furnish counsel to an indigent defendant."'" The Betts
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
11. Id. at 45-49.
12. Id. at 71. The Court took note of the following factors in deciding that a fair
trial required the appointment of counsel: the hostile atmosphere in which the trial took
place; the fact that the defendants were constantly under military guard; the ignorance
and illiteracy of the defendants; the fact that the defendants were residents of other
states; and the youth of the defendants. Id.
13. Id. at 71. Justice Sutherland's majority opinion stated that because the assis-
tance of counsel is of such a fundamental character, lack of counsel can impair a defend-
ant's due process rights to a hearing guaranteed by the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. Although the Court noted the question of whether due pro-
cess required the appointment of counsel to represent defendants in other state criminal
prosecutions, or under other circumstances, the Court limited its holding to the facts of
Powell.
14. Id.
15. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
16. Id. at 464. A previous Supreme Court decision held that the sixth amendment
required appointment of counsel to indigents in all federal trials. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938). However, the Betts Court held that the fourteenth amendment's due
Court endorsed a case-by-case analysis of the proceedings to deter-
mine whether a trial without counsel is fundamentally fair and
right.
17
For the next twenty-one years, the Betts decision was heavily criti-
cized. Determination of when an indigent criminal defendant re-
quired the appointment of counsel proved unworkable.18 Finally, in
1963, in Gideon v. Wainwright'9 the Court formally overruled
Betts2° by holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel was
"fundamental and essential to fair trials.'
Gideon, an indigent defendant accused of a felony, was convicted
after being refused the aid of court-appointed counsel.22 The Su-
preme Court reversed and held that an indigent defendant "cannot
be assured a fair trial" without the assistance of court-appointed
counsel. 23 Through the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment,2 4 Gideon requires that states provide a court-appointed counsel
process clause was not necessarily violated when a state failed to appoint.counsel for an
indigent defendant. Betts, 316 U.S. at 461-63.
17. Betts, 316 U.S. at 473.
18. In 1945 the Court held that in some circumstances due process may require
the appointment of counsel to defend an indigent accused in non-capital state cases. Rice
v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945). Three years later, the Court held that due process re-
quires the appointment of counsel in non-capital state felony cases only when there were"special circumstances." Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948). However, the Court often
found "special circumstances" requiring the appointment of counsel. Annotation, Consti-
tutionally Protected Right of Indigent Accused to Appointment of Counsel in State
Court Prosecution, 93 A.L.R.2d 747 (1964 & Supp. 1990).
19. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20. Id. at 345.
21. Id. at 344. The indigent defendant, Gideon, was charged with a felony and
subsequently denied appointment of counsel at trial. Gideon presented his defense to the
best of his ability as a layman and was subsequently convicted and sentenced to a five
year prison term. On appeal, Gideon argued that failure to appoint counsel denied him
his sixth amendment right to counsel. The state supreme court rejected Gideon's argu-
ment. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 336-37.
22. Id. at 336-37.
23. Id. at 344. In support, the Court noted that both the government and monied
defendants hire the best lawyers possible to prepare and present their cases. The Court
noted a "widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries."
Id.
24. Id. at 342. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution denies
the States the power to "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.. . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Thus, the sixth amendment's right to
counsel was incorporated through the fourteenth amendment.
Other rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments have been incorporated and
held to be binding on the states by the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
These incorporated rights include the rights of speech, press, and religion covered by the
first amendment, see, e.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927), the fourth amendment
rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), and the fifth amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination,
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). In addition to the right to counsel, other sixth
amendment rights have been incorporated, including the right to a speedy trial, Klopfer
v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), the right to a public trial, In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257 (1948), and the right to confront opposing witnesses, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
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to indigent accused. Although the Gideon rationale is not limited to
felony cases, the Supreme Court did not indicate the extent of the
indigent's right to court-appointed counsel until it decided
Argersinger v. Hamlin25 in 1972.
Argersinger, an uncounseled indigent defendant, was convicted of
a misdemeanor offense and given a three month jail sentence. 26 The
Florida Supreme Court, in a four-to-three decision, rejected
Argersinger's argument that he was denied his sixth amendment
right to counsel. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court
considered whether the right to court-appointed counsel should be
treated similarly to the right to trial by jury. Although the Court
had previously limited the right to jury for trials where potential im-
prisonment is greater than six months, the Court refused to similarly
limit the right to assistance of counsel.
28
The Court held that Gideon's rationale extended beyond criminal
felony prosecutions. 29 The Court wrote that counsel is necessary for
a fair trial, even in trials for petty offenses. 30 Because the problems
associated with misdemeanors and petty offenses often require the
presence of counsel to ensure the accused a fair trial,31 the Court
held that "no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented
by counsel at his trial.
'32
The Court extended Argersinger the right to court-appointed
(1965).
25. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
26. Id. Argersinger was charged in Florida state court with carrying a concealed
weapon, a misdemeanor offense punishable by imprisonment up to six months, a $1,000
fine, or both. After representing himself at trial, he was convicted and given a three
month jail sentence. He then brought a habeas corpus action in the Florida Supreme
Court, alleging that he had been deprived of his sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. at
26.
27. Id. The Florida Supreme Court followed the rule announced in Duncan v. Lou-
isiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that right to jury trial attaches only for trials for
non-petty offenses punishable by more than six months imprisonment). Id. at 27. Because
Argersinger could only be imprisoned up to six months, and not more, his right to court-
appointed counsel was held not to attach. Id.
28. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 30.
29. Id. at 32.
30. Id. at 33.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 37 (emphasis added). The Court allows indigent defendants to make a
"knowing and intelligent waiver" of their right to counsel. Id. Many disputes concerning
the collateral use of uncounseled convictions examine the validity of such waivers. There
are no restrictions on the collateral use of uncounseled convictions when a valid waiver is
given. This Comment does not address cases involving valid waivers of the right to
counsel.
counsel because he was imprisoned for his offense. However, it was
not until Scott v. Illinois, 3 decided seven years later, that the Court
clarified the extent of the right it announced in Argersinger. In
Scott, the Court considered whether the right to court-appointed
counsel extended to a defendant who was only fined for an offense
which was punishable by either fine or imprisonment.
Scott, an uncounseled indigent defendant, was convicted of shop-
lifting and fined. 34 Scott faced a possible jail sentence for the of-
fense.35 At trial, Scott contended that, according to the Court's ra-
tionale in Argersinger, he should have been provided counsel because
imprisonment was a possible penalty.36 The Supreme Court
disagreed.
3 7
The Court interpreted Argersinger as stating "that incarceration
was so severe a sanction" that an indigent defendant could .not be
imprisoned unless the defendant had been offered court-appointed
counsel at trial.3 8 However, the Scott Court limited the Argersinger
rule to indigents actually imprisoned. The right to court-appointed
counsel is unavailable to an indigent defendant for which prison is
but a mere possibility. Because Scott had not been imprisoned for his
offense, the Court held that he was not entitled to court-appointed
counsel.39 Therefore, under Scott and Argersinger, a trial court may
constitutionally deny an indigent court-appointed counsel and obtain
a conviction, providing the defendant .is not actually imprisoned as a
result.4 o
II. LIMITATIONS ON THE COLLATERAL USE OF PRIOR
UNCOUNSELED CONVICTIONS
Scott and Argersinger did not address the issue of whether an un-
counseled conviction which did not result in imprisonment may be
used collaterally.41 The Court considered this issue for the first time
33. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
34. Id. at 368.
35. Id. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-1.
36. Scott, 440 U.S. at 368
37. Id. at 374.
38. Id. at 372-73.
39. Id. at 374.
40. Id. Justice Powell concurred although he preferred a more flexible approach to
the appointment of counsel. Id. at 374-75 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, dissented. Id. at 375-89
(Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting). The dissenters argued that counsel
should be appointed, not only when the defendant was actually imprisoned, but whenever
imprisonment was an authorized sentence for the offense. Id. at 381-89. They noted that
many states required counsel where any imprisonment was authorized, Id. at 388.
Justice Blackmun also dissented. Id. at 389-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He would
have extended the right to court-appointed counsel to an indigent criminal defendant
whose offense was punishable by more than six months imprisonment. Id. at 389-90.
41. In general, any issue raised in a subsequent proceeding that is not directly
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in 1980 when it decided Baldasar v. Illinois.42 Baldasar, an indigent
defendant, was convicted of misdemeanor theft. At trial, he was not
represented by counsel.4" Under Illinois law, a first offense for misde-
meanor theft is punishable by fine or imprisonment up to one year,
while a second conviction for the same offense may be treated as a
felony with a prison term of one to three years." Baldasar was only
fined for the first offense.4 5 Within a year he was charged with a
second similar offense.46 At trial, defense counsel unsuccessfully ar-
gued that the prior uncounseled conviction was too unreliable to sup-
port enhancing the second offense to a felony. Baldasar was con-
victed of a felony and sentenced to prison. The Supreme Court
reversed.41
Justice Stewart wrote that Scott48 was violated because the sen-
tence was increased based upon a previously uncounseled convic-
tion.49 Justice Marshall agreed that a prior uncounseled misde-
meanor conviction was invalid for the purposes of enhancing
Baldasar's prison sentence.50 He argued that convictions obtained
without counsel were inherently unreliable and did not "become
more reliable merely because the accused has been validly convicted
of a subsequent offense. '
51
However, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion reversed
involved in the matter at hand is a collateral issue. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 237 (5th
ed. 1979). Uncounseled, and presumably unreliable, convictions have successfully been
used collaterally to increase sentencing for subsequent offenses. See, e.g., infra notes 67-
106 and accompanying text. This Comment questions the constitutionality of the collat-
eral use of uncounseled convictions for sentence enhancement purposes. See infra notes
152-91 and accompanying text.
42. 446 U.S. 222 (1980).
43. Id. at 223.
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 16-1(e)(1), 1005-8-1(9)(7), 1005-8-3(a)(1), 1005-9-
l(a)(l)-(2) (1975).
45. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 223.
46. Id. Baldasar was charged with stealing a shower head worth twenty-nine dol-
lars. A misdemeanor theft is defined under Illinois law to be a theft of property worth
less than one hundred and fifty dollars. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 16-1(e)(1), 1005-8-
1(b)(5), 1005-8-3(a)(1), 1005-9-1(a)(1)-(2) (1975). See supra text accompanying note
44.
47. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. at 224 (Stewart, Brennan, & Stevens, JJ., con-
curring) (per curiam).
48. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
49. Scott, 440 U.S. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 228 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall recognized that
Baldasar's first conviction was constitutionally valid under Scott because he was only
fined and not imprisoned. However, he argued that, although the conviction was valid, it
"was not valid for all purposes." Id. at 226.
51. Id. at 228.
Baldasar's conviction for different reasons.52 He would require court-
appointed counsel whenever an indigent defendant is prosecuted for
an offense punishable by more than six months imprisonment. 53
Under this approach, Baldasar was entitled to counsel at his first
trial.54 Because "he was not represented by an attorney, that convic-
tion . . . is invalid and may not be used to support enhancement. ' 5
Justice Blackmun therefore did not endorse the plurality's reason-
ing. However, his vote was necessary to achieve a majority. Because
the majority failed to agree upon a rationale for its result, the scope
of the decision is questionable .5  At the very least, Baldasar estab-
lished that prior uncounseled convictions, punishable by more than a
six month imprisonment, cannot be used to increase a maximum
prison term under enhanced penalty statutes. 57 The applicability of
the Baldasar rule to subsequent DWI convictions is unclear. Specifi-
cally, the question remains whether prior uncounseled convictions
may be used to impose mandatory minimum prison sentences for re-
peat DWI offenders. The Supreme Court declined to answer that
question when, in 1987, it denied certiorari in Moore v. Georgia.68
III. THE COLLATERAL USE OF PRIOR UNCOUNSELED
CONVICTIONS TO IMPOSE MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON
SENTENCES ON REPEAT DWI OFFENDERS
A. The Application of Baldasar in the Supreme Court
In Scott, the Supreme Court held that an uncounseled misde-
meanor conviction is constitutionally valid as long as the indigent
defendant is not actually incarcerated.' 9 Baldasar held that such a
conviction could not be used under an enhanced penalty statute to
increase the maximum prison sentence for a subsequent misde-
meanor conviction.6" In Moore, the Supreme Court denied certiorari
52. Id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
53. Id. Justice Blackmun's deciding vote was premised on his dissent in Scott, 440
U.S. 367 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra note 40.
54. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 230. Baldasar's first conviction was punishable by a
maximum of one year imprisonment and a fine of not more than one thousand dollars.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
55. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 230.
56. See Rudstein, The Collateral Use of Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convictions
after Scott and Baldasar, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 517, 529 (1982).
57. Id. The Baldasar Court did not address the question of using prior uncoun-
seled convictions collaterally to increase mandatory minimum penalties. However, be-
cause uncounseled convictions, according to sixth amendment precedent, are presumably
unreliable, this Comment suggests that they should not be used collaterally to increase
any penalty, either maximum or minimum. See infra text accompanying notes 162-63.
58. 484 U.S. 904 (1987) (White, J., dissenting).
59. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). See supra notes 38-40 and ac-
companying text.
60. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 224 (1980). See supra notes 48-57 and ac-
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when asked whether an indigent defendant's two prior uncounseled
DWI convictions could be used to increase the minimum prison sen-
tence for a subsequent DWI conviction.
6 1
Both on the streets and in the courts, Linda Moore was a three-
time loser. In 1982, she pled no contest to a DWI charge and was
fined. In 1985, she pled guilty to another DWI charge, was ordered
to pay a fine, perform eighty hours of community service, and sur-
render her driver's license. Moore, an apparent indigent, had neither
retained nor obtained court-appointed counsel for either conviction.
Four months later, Moore again was arrested for DWI. Georgia
law imposes a mandatory minimum sentence on defendants con-
victed of DWI three or more times.62 Moore's court-appointed law-
yer contended that Baldasar prohibited the court from using her two
previous uncounseled convictions to impose a mandatory minimum
prison term for a third DWI conviction. The trial court rejected that
contention, Moore pled guilty, and the court sentenced her to three
months in jail.
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals determined that
Baldasar was inapposite because the third conviction merely im-
posed a minimum prison term based on Moore's prior convictions
and did not "increas[e] the maximum confinement authorized [or]
conver[t] a misdemeanor offense into a felony."6 3 Both the Supreme
Court of Georgia and the Supreme Court of the United States de-
companying text.
61. Moore v. Georgia, 484 U.S. 904 (1987). There is no apparent basis for distin-
guishing between enhancement of maximum jail sentencing and enhancement of mini-
mum jail sentencing. Both enhancements result in increased incarceration time, presuma-
bly prohibited by Baldasar and prior sixth amendment precedent. See supra notes 32-57
and accompanying text.
However, because Baldasar was a 5-4 plurality decision, the scope of the decision is
questionable. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text. Changes in public attitude
toward drunk driving and changes in Court membership since 1980 might explain why
certiorari was denied in Moore.
62. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-391(c)(1)-(3) (1985). Section 40-6-391(c)(3) provides
in part that:
(c) Every person convicted of violating this Code section shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as follows:
(3) For the third or subsequent conviction within a five-year period of time
(A) A fine of $1,000.00, . . . and
(B)(i) A mandatory period of imprisonment of not less than 120 days nor
more than one year ....
Id. at § 40-6-391(c)(3) (emphasis added).
63. Moore v. State, 181 Ga. App. 548, 549, 352 S.E.2d 821, 822 (1987) (emphasis
added), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 904 (1987).
nied certiorari. 4 In his dissent, Justice White observed that the state
courts were in conflict over whether Baldasar applied to these or
similar facts.65 Because of the uneven application of Baldasar's hold-
ing in the state courts, he would have granted certiorari "to answer
the outstanding questions concerning Baldasar's scope and proper
application. 66 Since 1980, courts have applied Baldasar in DWI re-
peat offender cases with differing results. Some states, as Georgia
did in Moore, have narrowed the application of Baldasar and have
allowed the use of prior uncounseled convictions to impose a
mandatory minimum prison term in repeat DWI offender cases.
Others have read Baldasar more broadly and have not allowed the
use of prior uncounseled convictions in similar circumstances. A sur-
vey of the application of Baldasar in sentencing repeat DWI offend-
ers may illuminate the differing results.
B. Decisions Allowing the Use of Prior Uncounseled Convictions
to Impose Mandatory Minimum Prison Sentences
on Subsequent DWI Offenders
The rationale for allowing the use of prior uncounseled convictions
to impose mandatory minimum prison terms on repeat DWI offend-
ers is typified in State v. Novak.67 Frank Novak was convicted as a
second-time DWI offender and sentenced to five days in jail. On ap-
peal, Novak's court-appointed counsel argued that it was improper
to impose the mandatory minimum jail sentence required under Wis-
consin law for second DWI convictions. His counsel contended that
because the first conviction was obtained without counsel, it could
not be used as a basis for subjecting Novak to incarceration as a
repeat offender.68 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected that
contention.6 9
The court read Baldasar as holding that some uncounseled convic-
tions, valid under Argersinger and Scott because they did not result
in incarceration, "may be used as the basis for sentencing . . . a
repeat offender upon a subsequent conviction. °70 The court noted
that, under Wisconsin law, a first-time DWI offender is not incarcer-
ated but is merely subject to a civil forfeiture.7 1 Because Novak was
64. Moore, 484 U.S. at 904.
65. Id. at 905 (White, J., dissenting).
66. Id. Justice White stated that "[p]ossibly because this Court was sharply di-
vided in Baldasar, with no opinion for reversal gaining more than three votes, courts
attempting to apply that decision have come to different conclusions concerning its mean-
ing." Id.
67. 107 Wis. 2d 31, 318 N.W.2d 364 (1982).
68. Id. at 35, 318 N.W.2d at 366.
69. Id. at 40, 318 N.W.2d at 369.
70. Id. at 41-42, 318 N.W.2d at 369.
71. Id. at 35, 318 N.W.2d at 366.
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not exposed to imprisonment in his initial conviction, the court found
that Baldasar did not apply.72
The court considered the consequences of applying a broader in-
terpretation of Baldasar in cases where subsequent DWI offenses
impose mandatory minimum jail terms. It noted that a broader in-
terpretation of Baldasar would require that "every indigent person
accused of first offense drunk driving" be appointed counsel at public
expense.73 On balance, the court held that the increased costs of pro-
viding counsel would "far outweigh any possible 'benefits' [that]
such [a] requirement would produce.1 74 The court concluded by
holding that "under Baldasar, . . . the United States Constitution
do[es] not preclude imposing incarceration upon a second [D]WI
conviction where the defendant was not represented by counsel in the
proceedings leading to the first conviction.
'7 5
A year later, the Wisconsin court's rationale was embraced by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Schindler
v. Clerk of Circuit Court.76 Schindler, an apparent indigent, was
charged with his third DWI offense within a five year period.
77
Under the statute, a second DWI offense within a five year period
requires the imposition of a five-day minimum jail sentence; a third
DWI offense within the same period requires the imposition of a
thirty-day minimum jail sentence.7 8 Schindler's two prior DWI con-
victions were obtained without counsel.
At trial, Schindler's counsel argued that Baldasar prohibited the
72. Id. at 39, 318 N.W.2d at 368.
73. Id. at 42, 318 N.W.2d at 370.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 40, 318 N.W.2d at 369.
76. 715 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984).
77. Id. at 342.
78. Id. At the time of Schindler's trial the DWI statute provided in part:
(2)(a) Any person violating s. 346.63(1) [operating a motor vehicle under the
influence of an intoxicant]:
1. Shall forfeit not less than $100 nor more than $500, except as provided in
subd. 2 or 3.
2. Shall be fined not less than $250 nor more than $1,000 and imprisoned
not less than 5 days nor more than 6 months if the total of revocations under s.
343.305 and convictions for violation of s. 346.63(1) or local ordinances in con-
formity therewith equals 2 within a 5-year period ....
3. Shall be fined not less than $500 nor more than $2,000 and imprisoned
for not less than 30 days nor more than one year in the county jail if the total
of revocations under s. 343.305 and convictions for violation of s. 346.63(1) or
local ordinances in conformity therewith equals 3 or more within a 5-year pe-
riod ....
Id. n.1 (emphasis added) (citing WIs. STAT. § 346.65(2)(a) (1979-80)).
imposition of the enhanced sentence predicated upon the earlier un-
counseled conviction. The trial court found Baldasar inapplicable
and sentenced Schindler to jail for the mandatory minimum period
imposed on third-time DWI offenders under the Wisconsin statute.
Relying on Baldasar, the district court reversed. The district court
held that, under Baldasar, an uncounseled civil forfeiture may not
be used to enhance a jail sentence imposed by a later conviction. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.80 It de-
cided that Baldasar did not apply because of "the failure of the
Baldasar majority to agree upon a rationale for its result." 81 The
court reasoned that Schindler's prior uncounseled DWI conviction
was not used to support guilt or enhance punishment for his subse-
quent conviction, and thus did not violate the Baldasar rule.82
Rather, the prior uncounseled conviction "had the effect of specifi-
cally putting Schindler on notice" of the consequences of repeated
offenses and warned him that future DWI "violations would subject
him to criminal sanctions. ' 83 The initial conviction was merely used
to "establish his deviant conduct and classification for future drunk
driving violations. 84 The court questioned the wisdom of applying
the Baldasar rule in these specific circumstances. It asserted that
requiring court-appointed counsel for DWI first-offense trials "would
prove burdensome, exorbitantly expensive, and in many cases com-
pletely unnecessary."s Based on these public policy reasons, the
court held that an uncounseled DWI conviction may be used to es-
tablish the status of the defendant. Once established, the mandatory
minimum prison sentence is then merely "predicated on the defend-
ant's status as an adjudicated offender, not on the reliability of the"
prior uncounseled conviction."8 Thus, the court held that Baldasar
was not violated and that the prior uncounseled conviction "may pro-
vide a basis" for subjecting a defendant to a mandatory minimum
prison sentence.
Schindler, and other decisions that interpret Baldasar narrowly,
8 7
79. Id.
80. Id. at 347.
81. Id. at 344.
82. Id. at 345.
83. Id. at 346.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 347 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Robles-Sandoval, 637 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981) (un-
counseled deportation conviction may be used to create the status of deportee for the
defendant and was not invalid for the purpose of supporting guilt or enhancing punish-
ment in subsequent criminal proceeding for illegally reentering the United States after
deportation); State v. O'Neill, 473 A.2d 415 (Me. 1984) (uncounseled DWI conviction
may be used to classify defendant as a habitual offender and subject the defendant to
criminal sanctions for operating vehicle after revocation of license); and Commonwealth
v. Thomas, 510 Pa. 106, 507 A.2d 57 (Pa. 1986) (uncounseled retail theft summary
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rely on both public policy and the classification rationale discussed
above. The rationale that uncounseled convictions may be used to
place defendants into a status which may subsequently be used to
impose longer jail sentences was derived from the Supreme Court's
decision in Lewis v. United States.8
In 1961, George Lewis, Jr., without counsel, pled guilty to a fel-
ony in a Florida state court and served a term of imprisonment. 9 In
1977, sixteen years later, Lewis was charged with knowingly receiv-
ing and possessing a firearm in violation of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act.90 The Act makes it a federal criminal of-
fense for a person who "has been convicted by a court of the United
States or of a State ... of a felony" to receive, possess, or transport
a firearm.9 1
At trial, Lewis contended that, under Gideon, a violation of the
statute could not be predicated on a prior conviction obtained in the
absence of defense counsel. The .trial court rejected that contention
and ruled that the constitutionality of the prior conviction was im-
material when used to establish Lewis' status as a previously con-
victed felon. 2 The decision was affirmed on appeal and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 93
The Court focused on the statutory language and legislative his-
tory of the Act.94 The Court found that Congress could rationally
classify a person as a felon without requiring proof of "the validity of
the predicate conviction. 95 Accordingly, Congress could rationally
use any prior felony conviction, "even an allegedly invalid one," as a
basis on which to prohibit possession of a firearm. The convicted
felon is "presumptively dangerous" 97 and prohibited from transport-
offense convictions may be'used under an enhanced penalty statute to convert subsequent
offenses into misdemeanors which carry longer prison term sentences).
88. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
89. Id. at 56-57. Lewis was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to com-
mit a misdemeanor. Id.
90. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (1976).
91. Id. Section 1202(a)(1) provides in part that any person who has been convicted
of a felony and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce any firearm shall be
fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not more than two years, or
both. Id.
92. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 58.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 60-66.
95. Id. at 63.
96. Id. at 66.
97. Id. at 64. The Court, in interpreting the statute, noted that it "prohibits cate-
gories of presumptively dangerous persons from transporting or receiving firearms." Id.
(emphasis added). The language of the statute and legislative intent made it clear to the
ing or receiving firearms. Therefore, the Court held that a prior un-
counseled felony conviction resulting in imprisonment, although pre-
sumptively unreliable, could be used as a basis for imposing criminal
sanctions for violations of the Act.9 8 Because "[e]nforcement of that
essentially civil disability through criminal sanctions does not 'sup-
port guilt or enhance punishment',"8' 9 it is permissible. 100
Many of the decisions permitting the use of prior uncounseled con-
victions for imposing mandatory minimum prison sentences for sub-
sequent DWI convictions cite Lewis to support their holdings. For
example, the Schindler court found the civil firearms disability im-
posed on Lewis analogous to the civil forfeiture conviction imposed
on Schindler.101 Similar to the Lewis "status" rationale, the Schin-
dler court interpreted the Wisconsin statute as creating a status of
convicted DWI offenders.' 0 2 Once established in that category, an
individual is subject to criminal sanctions such as mandatory mini-
mum prison terms.'0 3
Although Lewis was decided two months before Baldasar,1°0 it
was mentioned only once in a footnote appended to the dissent's
opinion. 05 Lewis was neither overruled nor narrowed by Baldasar.
Because of the conflicting results, the Court sent a confusing mes-
sage to the state courts, which responded with diverse holdings.100
Court that a person could be placed in this category via an unconstitutional, and there-
fore invalid conviction. Id. at 63.
98. Id. at 67. The Court observed that Congress was focusing on the nexus be-
tween violent crime and the possession of firearms by people with criminal records. Id. at
66. The statute was enacted in response to an increase in political assassinations and
violent crime. Id. at 63. Because the mere fact of conviction would classify a person as a
convicted felon, its validity was immaterial with regard to the classification. Id. at 62.
99. Id. at 67 (quoting Burgett v. Texas 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967)).
100. Id. The Court relied on two premises in reaching its conclusion: First, the
Court stated that they had repeatedly "recognized ... that a legislature constitutionally
may prohibit a convicted felon from engaging in activities far more fundamental than the
possession of a firearm." Id. at 66. Second, the Court found that "it [was] important to
note that a convicted felon may challenge the validity of a prior conviction, or otherwise
remove his disability, before obtaining a firearm." Id. at 67. Because a convicted felon
could have challenged the prior uncounseled conviction in order to remove the firearm
disability, the Court held that the firearms prosecution did not "open the predicate con-
viction to a new form of collateral attack." Id.
101. Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984).
102. Id. at 347. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
103. Schindler, 715 F.2d at 347.
104. Lewis was decided on February 27, 1980. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55
(1980). Baldasar was decided on April 22, 1980. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222
(1980). Interestingly, Baldasar was argued before Lewis. Baldasar was argued on No-
vember 26, 1979; Lewis was argued on January 7, 1980.
105. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 234 n.3 (Burger, CJ., Powell, White & Rehnquist, JJ.,
dissenting). The dissenters argued that the Baldasar "decision is all the more puzzling in
view" of the decision in Lewis. Id.
106. For a critical analysis of the two decisions, see generally Case Comment,
Constitutional Law; Sixth Amendment; Right to Counsel; Use of Prior Uncounseled
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To this point, this Comment has investigated the line of decisions
that have narrowly interpreted the Baldasar rule. A survey of deci-
sions which have interpreted Baldasar more broadly follows. These
decisions disallow the use of uncounseled convictions to impose
mandatory minimum prison terms on repeat DWI offenders.
C. Decisions Disallowing the Use of Prior Uncounseled
Convictions to Impose Mandatory Minimum Prison
Sentences on Subsequent DWI Offenders
The rationale for disallowing the use of prior uncounseled convic-
tions to impose mandatory minimum prison terms on repeat DWI
offenders is typified in State v. Dowd.117 Kirk Dowd was charged
with operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license. His license
had been suspended as a result of a prior uncounseled DWI convic-
tion. 0 8 At trial, Dowd stipulated to having operated a vehicle with a
suspended license.'09 However, Dowd's counsel argued that the court
could not impose the mandatory jail sentence for driving with a sus-
pended license. 110 Dowd's counsel contended that, because the DWI
conviction had been obtained without counsel, it could not be used as
a predicate for the subsequent suspended license offense."' The
court rejected that contention and sentenced Dowd to a seven day
jail term. The Superior Court affirmed."1
2
The Supreme Court of Maine vacated the sentence."13 In compar-
ing the Lewis and Baldasar rationale, the court concluded that they
could be distinguished by analyzing the statutes involved in those
cases. "The distinction . . . is whether the statute considered en-
hances punishment, or punishes criminally a civil disability which
has been imposed by" the legislature." 4 In analyzing the DWI stat-
ute, the court found that imprisonment is mandatory only when the
underlying license suspension is a result of a conviction for DWI or
failure to submit to a blood-alcohol test." 5 Because a prior uncoun-
Convictions: Lewis v. United States & Baldasar, 14 AKRON L. REv. 155 (1980).
107. 478 A.2d 671 (Me. 1984).
108. Id. at 674.




112. Id. at 675.
113. Id. at 678. Maine has no appellate court other than the supreme court.
114. Id. at 678 (emphasis added).
115. Id.
seled conviction directly results in enhancement of a prison sentence
in this case, the "result is contrary to the teaching of
Baldasar .. ."I16 The court held that "no mandatory penalty could
be imposed" for driving with a suspended license where the license is
suspended because of an uncounseled conviction.
117
In similar circumstances, the Supreme Court of North Dakota
compared the Lewis and Baldasar decisions when it decided State v.
Orr."8 Kenneth Orr was convicted of DWI. He appealed after being
sentenced as a second offender. The supreme court held that Orr
could not be sentenced to mandatory imprisonment as a second DWI
offender when his first DWI conviction resulted from an uncounseled
guilty plea.1" 9
On appeal, the state argued that the DWI statute, 120 like the stat-
ute in Lewis, did not enhance punishment due to a past conviction.
Rather, the state argued that "the focus of the increased punishment
provided by [the DWI statute] is not on the reliability of the previ-
ous uncounseled conviction, but on the mere fact of conviction.''
The supreme court disagreed. 22 It found the DWI statute distin-
guishable from the federal gun disability statute of Lewis for two
major reasons: (1) "[a] first DWI conviction may result in incarcera-
tion and is therefore not an essentially civil disability," and (2) the
DWI statute, unlike the federal statute in Lewis, does not permit a
DWI offender to expunge or limit the effect of a DWI conviction.
23
Consequently, the court concluded that it was "clearly an enhance-
ment statute that necessarily focuses on the reliability of the first
conviction, and not on the mere fact of its occurrence.'
'1 24
Guided by the sixth amendment decisions of the Supreme Court,
especially Argersinger and Scott, the court explained the rationale
for its decision:
[w]hether the imprisonment is a result of a first conviction, as in Scott, or
because of a conviction for a subsequent offense, as in Orr's case, makes no
difference. Merely because Orr was validly convicted of a second offense
does not confer reliability on his earlier uncounseled conviction. Further-
more, because the defect in Orr's prior conviction was the denial of counsel,
he would, in effect, "suffer anew" the deprivation of his right to counsel if
he were subsequently imprisoned solely because of the previous uncounseled
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 375 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1985).
119. Id. at 178-79.
120. The DWI statute provides that the sentence for a second DWI conviction
within five years must include at least four-days' imprisonment, of which 48 hours must
be served consecutively, or ten-days' community service, at least a $500.00 fine and refer-
ral for addiction evaluation. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(4)(b) (1985 & Supp. 1991).
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conviction.1
2 5
Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision
and remanded with instructions that Orr be sentenced as if he had
no prior conviction. 2 '
The Orr court recognized the practical consequences of its deci-
sion. Courts following it would need to obtain a valid waiver of coun-
sel or appoint counsel for an indigent DWI defendant "regardless of
the penalty to be imposed, if enhancement of punishment for a sub-
sequent conviction is not to be precluded."1117 While this may impose
an economic burden on the state, the Orr court emphasized that the
"constitution must prevail."' 2 The court held that the constitutional
rights of DWI indigent defendants that commit subsequent DWI of-
fenses cannot be dependent upon a theory that it is less expensive to
deny them their rights rather than to afford them. 29
Under similar circumstances, a 1987 Virginia Court of Appeals
decision, Sargent v. Commonwealth,'30 applied Baldasar broadly
when it prohibited a mandatory minimum jail sentence for a third
DWI offense, because it was predicated on an uncounseled DWI
conviction.' At trial, Timmy Joe Sargent was convicted of DWI,
his third offense within five years. Sargent, an apparent indigent,
was not represented by counsel at his two earlier convictions. Despite
Sargent's argument that the uncounseled convictions could not be
constitutionally used to enhance his sentence for a third offense, the
trial court imposed a three-month jail sentence.
132
On appeal, the court of appeal considered the question whether
the two misdemeanor convictions for DWI could be used to enhance
punishment for a third DWI offense.' 33 The state argued that be-
cause the predicate convictions did not result in Sargent's incarcera-
tion, they were not prohibited by Baldasar and were properly used to
convict and sentence him as a third offender under the DWI stat-
125. Id. at 178.
126. Id. at 180.
127. Id. at 179.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 5 Va. App. 143, 360 S.E.2d 895 (1987).
131. Id. at 150, 360 S.E.2d at 899.
132. Id. at 145, 360 S.E.2d at 896.
133. Id. at 146, 360 S.E.2d at 896-97.
ute.13 4 The court of appeal disagreed.135
Although the court agreed that the two prior convictions were con-
stitutionally "valid convictions since no jail time was imposed," it
held that they "cannot be used under an enhanced penalty statute"
such as the one involved here. 3 ' The court disagreed with the state's
contention that Baldasar should be narrowly applied. It stated that
Baldasar rests on the "fact of the prison term rather than the classi-
fication of the offense as a felony or misdemeanor.
1 3 7
The court noted that, although Sargent's sentence was within the
range permissible for a first offense, he was in fact tried and sen-
tenced for a third DWI offense. The court concluded that imposing a
mandatory minimum jail sentence based on prior uncounseled con-
victions was enhancement of sentencing and was not "in keeping
with the teaching of Baldasar . . .. ,"18 The court reversed Sargent's
conviction holding that:
Sargent could not constitutionally have been imprisoned for either one of
his previous convictions unless he was represented by counsel or waived his
right to such representation. The Supreme Court's decision in Baldasar pro-
hibits the Commonwealth now from doing indirectly what it could not ac-
complish directly in the case of either of Sargent's two prior convictions.'1 9
Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Moore,1 40 and be-
cause the Baldasar majority did not agree upon a rationale for its
results,1 41 the state courts have applied the rule announced in
Baldasar with differing and confusing results. Lewis v. United
States1 42 merely amplified the confusion, as witnessed by the deci-
sions discussed above. When courts have construed Baldasar nar-
rowly, allowing the use of uncounseled convictions for imposing
mandatory minimum prison sentences on repeat DWI offenders, they
have typically used one of the following three approaches.
First, by distinguishing the facts in their cases from the facts of
Baldasar, some courts, such as State v. Novak, hold that Baldasar
134. Id. at 147, 360 S.E.2d at 898. When the first two DWI convictions occurred
in 1982, the statute provided in part that upon conviction of a first DWI offense, the
defendant may be fined and jailed for not more than twelve months. VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-270 (1950 & Supp. 1991).
A second offense carried a fine and a jail sentence of not less than one month nor more
than one year; forty-eight hours of jail sentence may not be suspended. Id. A third of-
fense carried a fine and a jail sentence of not less than two months nor more than one
year; thirty days of the jail sentence may not be suspended. Id.
135. Sargent, 5 Va. App. at 149, 360 S.E.2d at 899.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 150, 360 S.E.2d at 899.
138. Id. at 153, 360 S.E.2d at 901.
139. Id. at 155, 360 S.E.2d at 902 (emphasis added).
140. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
142. 445 U.S. 55 (1980). See supra notes 88-106 and accompanying text,
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does not apply.143 Second, by using the "status" rationale of Lewis"'
to hold that an uncounseled conviction could validly place a defend-
ant into a status as a "convicted offender," other courts, such as
Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, hold that Baldasar does not
apply.145 Third, by balancing the costs with the benefits, some courts,
such as Schindler, hold that Baldasar should not apply.
1 46
Conversely, when courts construe Baldasar broadly, disallowing
the use of uncounseled convictions for imposing mandatory minimum
prison sentences on repeat DWI offenders, they reject these ap-
proaches. Sargent v. Commonwealth, for example, held that the es-
sential Baldasar fact inquiry is whether incarceration is based upon
an uncounseled conviction. If incarceration is based solely upon an
uncounseled conviction, these courts apply the Baldasar rule and do
not distinguish the facts of their cases from the facts of Baldasar.
1 47
Some courts, such as State v. Orr, reject the Lewis "status" ap-
proach.148 These courts hold the Lewis statute distinguishable from
DWI statutes and prohibit the use of uncounseled convictions to im-
pose mandatory minimum jail terms based upon a defendant's status
as a "convicted offender." 49 Finally, some courts, similar to the
court in Orr, have recognized the economic burden of appointing
counsel for indigent DWI offenders. 150 Although it may impose an
economic burden on the state, these courts hold that the appointment
of counsel is required by the constitution.151
The following is a critical analysis of the different rationales used
by the courts in their application of Baldasar to repeat DWI cases.
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF BALDASAR IN
REPEAT DWI OFFENDER DECISIONS
Decisions that interpret Baldasar narrowly, allowing the use of
prior uncounseled DWI convictions, employ rationales which can be
classified as: (1) factual distinctions; (2) status; and (3) public policy
143. Novak, 107 Wis. 2d at 39, 318 N.W.2d at 368 (1982). See supra notes 67-75
and accompanying text.
144. 445 U.S. 55 (1980). See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
145. Schindler, 715 F.2d at 344. See supra notes 82-84, 101-03 and accompanying
text.
146. Schindler, 715 F.2d at 347. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Sargent, 5 Va. App. at 150-51, 360 S.E.2d at 899. See supra notes
136-38 and accompanying text.
148. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 177 (N.D. 1985). See supra notes 123-25.
149. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 177.
150. Id. at 179. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
151. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 179. See supra text accompanying note 129.
arguments. The analysis below demonstrates why these arguments
do not pass muster in light of the Supreme Court's sixth amendment
decisions. 152
A. Factual Distinctions
As noted above, some courts distinguish the facts in their cases
from the facts in Baldasar to hold Baldasar inapplicable. 1 3 The
Moore v. Georgia court determined that Baldasar was inapposite be-
cause Moore's third conviction merely imposed a minimum prison
term based on prior uncounseled convictions and did not enhance the
maximum prison term. 5 4 The State v. Novak court found Baldasar
inapposite because Novak had not been exposed to incarceration at
his initial DWI conviction. 155 Although factual distinctions can be
made between Baldasar and most DWI repeat offender cases, the
importance of these distinctions fades when one considers Baldasar's
underlying rationale.
Baldasar is the culmination of the Supreme Court's sixth amend-
ment decisions starting with Powell v. Alabama.156 Underlying the
holding of Baldasar is the strong belief that lawyers are essential to
ensure fair trials with accurate and reliable results. 157 The right to
counsel is considered to be more essential to a fair trial than the
right to a jury trial.158 Because uncounseled convictions are consid-
ered to be inherently unreliable, 59 they may not be used for "incar-
ceration" purposes.1 60
152. See supra notes 9-40 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thomas, 510 Pa. 106, 507 A.2d 57 (1986) (hold-
ing that convictions for summary offense of retail theft entered without the assistance of
counsel or valid waiver did not prohibit enhancement for second offense of retail theft
from summary offense to misdemeanor).
The concurring opinion distinguished the facts of Baldasar from the facts in Thomas.
Because the possible sentence for the defendant's first offense was the same as the sec-
ond, which enhanced the offense from summary offense to a misdemeanor, the concur-
ring opinion stated that although the "grading of the offense was affected, there [was] no
evidence that the sentence" had been enhanced. Id. at 112, 507 A.2d at 64 (emphasis in
original).
154. Moore, 181 Ga. App. at 549, 353 S.E.2d at 822. See supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
155. State v. Novak, 107 Wis. 2d 31, 39, 318 N.W.2d 364, 368 (1982). See supra
notes 70-72.
156. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 13, 21, 23, 24, 30, 31 and accompanying text.
158. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1972). See supra notes 27-28 and
accompanying notes.
159. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980). See supra note 50 and
accompanying text. Justice Marshall believed that uncounseled convictions were inher-
ently unreliable and did not "become more reliable merely because the accused has been
validly convicted of a subsequent offense." Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 227-28.
160. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979). See supra notes 38-40 and accom-
panying text.
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Although the facts of Baldasar may differ from most DWI repeat
offender cases, the Baldasar rationale applies to these cases. The
idea that incarceration is too serious a penalty to impose on an un-
counseled defendant transcends Baldasar's fact pattern. Uncoun-
seled convictions are presumptively unreliable.161 This presumption
has never been seriously questioned by either the Supreme Court or
any of the courts surveyed. Unless the assumption underlying the
Court's sixth amendment decisions is erroneous, courts which at-
tempt to factually distinguish DWI repeat offender cases from
Baldasar are misguided.
In order for Baldasar to apply, the only factual determination nec-
essary is whether a defendant's prison sentence is enhanced by an
uncounseled conviction. If it is, Baldasar prohibits it. The applicabil-
ity of Baldasar does not depend upon the label the state affixes to
the enhancement . 62 "Minimum" and "maximum" prison term en-
hancements both result in increasing a defendant's prison term based
on an inherently unreliable uncounseled conviction. In fact, using an
uncounseled conviction to impose a mandatory minimum prison term
might actually be more repugnant than using it to increase the maxi-
mum prison term. A judge has discretion in the latter circumstance
while no discretion is allowed in the former.
Nor should the applicability of Baldasar depend upon the nomen-
clature of the enhanced sentence. Whether a sentence is changed
from a "misdemeanor" to a "gross misdemeanor" or to a "felony" is
unimportant, so long as the prison term is not increased..
6
3
In summary, when the underlying rationale of Baldasar is
remembered, the factual distinctions fade in importance. It is not the
type of offense or the possibility of incarceration that is important.
Rather, the crucial factual determination required by Baldasar is
whether an uncounseled conviction has been used to enhance a de-
161. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 228. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., State v. Dowd, 478 A.2d 671 (Me. 1984). Although the defendant
was given a jail sentence for operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, the
court vacated the sentence because the license suspension was the result of an uncoun-
seled conviction. Id. at 678. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
The determining factor in applying Baldasar was not the label of the enhancement
(operating a vehicle with a suspended license). Rather, the determining factor in apply-
ing Baldasar was the fact that the defendant's prior uncounseled conviction directly re-
sulted in the enhancement of his prison sentence. This, the court held, was prohibited by
Baldasar. Dowd, 478 A.2d at 678.
163. See, e.g., Sargent v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 143, 360 S.E.2d 895 (1987).
The court in Sargent concluded that Baldasar rests upon the "fact of the prison term
rather than the classification of the offense as a felony or misdemeanor . .. ." Sargent, 5
Va. App. at 150, 360 S.E.2d at 899.
fendant's prison term. If it has, Baldasar applies to prohibit it.
B. Status
The Schindler court reasoned that an uncounseled DWI convic-
tion had the effect of putting a defendant on "notice" and validly
served as a warning that future DWI violations would result in im-
prisonment. 64 The Supreme Court used similar rationale in Lewis v.
United States.
165
Relying heavily on the statutory language involved in Lewis, the
Court concluded that a prior felony conviction, even an inherently
unreliable one, could be used to classify individuals into the status of
"convicted felon."' 166 Once the defendant was so classified, the Court
held that it was constitutional to enforce the civil disability (firearms
prohibition) with criminal sanctions (including incarceration). 67 Be-
cause the statute relied upon the mere fact of a conviction, not the
reliability of a conviction, the Court concluded that a defendant
could be incarcerated even though his or her class status was predi-
cated on an inherently unreliable conviction.' 68 Because this ration-
ale is questionable and inconsistent with previous sixth amendment
law, it should be scrutinized when applied in cases including repeat
DWI offenders.
Lewis is distinguishable from Baldasar. Lewis does not permit
sentence enhancement based upon prior uncounseled convictions.',
Rather, Lewis merely permits placement into a civil status which is
criminally punishable. Conversely, courts which allow the collateral
use of prior uncounseled convictions directly enhance sentencing of
repeat DWI offenders. Attempting to apply the Lewis holding, those
courts maintain that a DWI offender, once convicted, is placed into
the status of convicted DWI offender. 70 Once placed in that status,
the convicted DWI offender is subject to mandatory incarceration
for subsequent offenses. Although this approach is clever, it under-
mines sixth amendment precedent through Baldasar.
Using the Lewis "status" rationale, courts find that legislatures
may use a conviction, "even an allegedly invalid one,"' 7' to classify a
164. Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984). See supra text accompanying notes notes 82-83.
165. 445 U.S. 55 (1980). See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
166. Lewis; 415 U.S. at 66.
167. Id. at 67. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
168. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 67. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., State v. Novak, 107 Wis. 2d 31, 318 N.W.2d 364 (1982); Schindler
v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068
(1984). See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 71-72 and notes 85-86.
171. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 66 (1980). See supra notes 95-98 and
accompanying text.
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defendant as a convicted offender. 172 However, it is unreasonable to
assume that legislatures intend to impose mandatory minimum
prison sentences for repeat DWI offenses predicated upon constitu-
tionally invalid and inherently unreliable DWI convictions.
In fact, because of the assumed inherent lack of reliability of un-
counseled convictions to enhance sentencing, it would be unconstitu-
tional for statutes to be enacted which explicitly allowed their use.
Because legislatures are constitutionally prohibited from enacting
statutes which would explicitly allow the use of uncounseled convic-
tions to enhance sentencing, courts should not interpret statutes to
implicitly allow their use. Apparently, the courts using the Lewis ra-
tionale are persuaded that legislatures may constitutionally enact
statutes which deny a defendant's right to counsel. This is inconsis-
tent with sixth amendment precedent from Powell through
Baldasar.
In addition, superimposing the Lewis rationale onto DWI repeat
offender cases is somewhat misguided. The Lewis Court gave great
deference to Congress and its goals in enacting the firearms disabil-
ity act. 7 3 The Court held that a firearms disability, as opposed to
enhanced criminal sentencing, could be predicated upon an uncoun-
seled felony conviction.17 4 The Court further recognized that the
statute allowed a defendant to challenge his conviction and remove
the disability.'7 5 Finally, the Court recognized that a legislature may
prohibit convicted felons from engaging in activities far more funda-
mental to personal freedom than possession of firearms.7 6 Obviously,
there are important public safety reasons for ridding the highways of
drunken drivers. However, the analogy between a federal statute,
which prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms and com-
mitting assasinations, and state DWI statutes, is stretched. As the
court in State v. Orr found, DWI statutes, unlike the federal statute
involved in Lewis, do not permit a DWI offender to expunge or limit
the effect of his uncounseled DWI conviction.177 Nor will an indigent
likely challenge such a conviction until charged with a subsequent
offense. Presumably, an indigent will plead guilty to a first offense
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because the penalty is small compared to the cost of retaining coun-
sel. Thereafter, motivation for challenging the conviction dissipates.
Finally, while legislatures may prohibit convicted felons from en-
gaging in activities far more fundamental than possession of fire-
arms, it may not prohibit indigents from exercising their constitu-
tional rights. However, courts which permit mandatory minimum
prison sentences, predicated upon prior uncounseled DWI convic-
tions, allow legislatures to do what they could not otherwise constitu-
tionally accomplish. As the court in Sargent v. Commonwealth de-
clared, Baldasar prohibits a legislature from "doing indirectly what
it could not accomplish directly." 17 8 Baldasar is not concerned with
exactly how a prison term is enhanced by a prior uncounseled con-
viction. Rather, Baldasar is concerned with when a prison term is
enhanced, either directly or indirectly, by a prior uncounseled con-
viction. Baldasar prohibits such enhancement, whether accomplished
indirectly by placing the indigent into a "status" or through a more
direct approach.
C. Public Policy Arguments
Both the Novak and Schindler courts weighed the desirability of
repeat DWI offender statutes with the costs of appointing counsel to
ensure the reliability of first offense convictions. 179 The Novak court
observed that applying the Baldasar rule would require that all indi-
gent defendants accused of a first DWI offense be appointed counsel.
It found this requirement too costly and held that the increased costs
of such a requirement would far outweigh any possible benefits.180
The Schindler court was similarly fearful of the economic effects
of applying Baldasar under these circumstances. 181 It feared that re-
quiring a court appointed counsel for indigents charged with a first
DWI offense would "impose severe burdens on the State... (which]
would prove burdensome, exorbitantly expensive, and in many cases
completely unnecessary."182
Although these are valid concerns, constitutional rights cannot be
dependent upon a theory that it is more economical to deny them
than to afford them.18 3 Economic considerations realize diminished
relevance when constitutional guarantees are involved. 18 4 Because an
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indigent defendant "cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided,"' 85 a state deprives the defendant's liberty without due
process when it denies counsel due to economic considerations.
Although it could be argued that the constitution forbids depriva-
tion of any liberty interest without due process, Argersinger v. Ham-
lin and Scott v. Illinois drew the line at incarceration.'8 6 Appointing
indigents counsel in first offense DWI trials may be costly, but it is
required if the state imposes mandatory minimum prison sentences
for subsequent offenses. As the State v. Orr court declared, the con-
stitution "must prevail.' 8 7 The Orr court noted that not all DWI
defendants are indigent, and not all DWI violations recur. 8 8 The
economic burden of requiring court-appointed counsel might not be
as severe as the Schindler court suggested.
Finally, there was concern in both the Novak and Schindler deci-
sions that the costs of providing court-appointed counsel would far
outweigh any possible "benefits."' 8 9 The Schindler court stated that
in many cases such appointment would be completely unnecessary. 90
While this may be true, it is difficult to verify. The Supreme Court
assumes that uncounseled convictions are inherently unreliable.' 91
Therefore, the benefit derived from court-appointed counsel is the
knowledge that justice in an American court is not dependent upon a
defendant's ability to afford counsel. Although in some cases ap-
pointment of counsel may actually make no difference to the out-
come of a trial and, in reality, be completely unnecessary, the sixth
and fourteenth amendments, and related case law, deem it com-
pletely necessary.
CONCLUSION
Federal and state courts are divided as to whether uncounseled
DWI convictions may be used to impose mandatory minimum prison
sentences on repeat DWI offenders. The Supreme Court's decision in
Scott interprets Argersinger as establishing the line for appointment
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of counsel at actual incarceration. However, neither Scott nor
Argersinger answered the question whether a constitutionally valid
uncounseled DWI conviction, not resulting in incarceration, could be
used for collateral purposes. Baldasar held that such a conviction
may not be used to enhance prison terms for subsequent convictions.
However, because the justices in Baldasar were unable to agree
upon a rationale for their decision, the courts apply Baldasar in
DWI repeat offender cases with differing results. Some courts nar-
row the application of Baldasar by permitting the use of prior un-
counseled convictions to impose mandatory minimum prison terms in
repeat DWI offender cases. Using factual distinctions, "status" ra-
tionale, and public policy arguments, these courts hold Baldasar in-
applicable in repeat DWI offender cases.
Other courts interpret Baldasar broadly to disallow the use of un-
counseled convictions for imposing mandatory minimum prison
terms in repeat DWI offender cases. These courts hold that the es-
sential Baldasar inquiry is whether incarceration is based solely
upon an uncounseled conviction. If it is, they apply Baldasar to pro-
hibit the incarceration. These courts reject the "status" rationale and
public policy arguments and hold that Baldasar is applicable in re-
peat DWI offender cases.
Because the rationale used by courts that interpret Baldasar nar-
rowly do not pass muster in light of the Supreme Court's sixth
amendment decisions, that rationale should be rejected. When the
underlying rationale of Baldasar is remembered, that uncounseled
convictions are inherently unreliable and should not be used to en-
hance prison terms for subsequent offenses, factual distinctions fade
in importance. Also unconvincing are the attempts to superimpose
the "status" rationale of Lewis onto DWI repeat offender cases. Fi-
nally, although the appointment of counsel in DWI cases may im-
pose an economic burden on the states, the sixth and fourteenth
amendments, and related case law, require it. Accordingly, uncoun-
seled convictions should not be used to impose mandatory prison
sentences on repeat DWI offenders.
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